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In supporting its claim that the District's exclusive right violated
the Commerce Clause, the Club relied on C & A Carbone, Inc. v.
Clarkstown. In Carbone,the United States Supreme Court held that an
ordinance violated the Commerce Clause because it required all incounty possessors of trash to use a specific transfer station, thus
depriving in-state and/or out-of-state processors of waste processing
and disposal business. The Kansas Supreme Court distinguished this
case from Carbone in that the District, itself, performs the entire piped
pressurized water production and delivery operation within its
boundaries; thus, it provided a municipal service.
The supreme court also relied on U.S.A. Recycling, Inc. v. Town of
Babylon. The court applied the reasoning in U.S.A. and held that in
creating the District, Kansas had not favored in-state water producers
over out-of-state competitors nor had it hindered business from
competing against a group of local proprietors. Based on this
reasoning, the supreme court found the market participant exception
inapplicable. The State of Kansas eliminated the market for piped
water when it created the District, which, in turn, fulfilled a
governmental duty. Therefore, no market existed due to the exclusive
nature of the municipal services. Furthermore, the District did not
impose any burdens on interstate commerce and arguably, the benefits
of the municipal services would outweigh any burdens that may have
been placed on interstate commerce.
Anna Litaker

MAINE
Dorey v. Spicer, 715 A.2d 182 (Me. 1998) (holding that the owner of
downstream property had no flowage rights relative to upstream dam
when: (1) he did not own lot on which dam was located; (2) the
easement he relied upon, created by conveyance of half-interest in the
sawmill, was extinguished when gristmill owner gave back that interest
to sawmill owner; (3) any appurtenant easement, created by the Mills
Act, was incapable of existence separate from the land containing the
dam).
Peter M. Dorey ("Dorey") the downstream owner of property along
Gristmill Brook ("Brook"), which originated from Foster Pond
("Pond"), filed an action naming as defendants forty-four owners of
waterfront property on the Pond. Dorey sought a declaration of his
rights to operate the Pond dam, inclusive of a right to flood the
waterfront land of the Pond. Dorey also sought an injunction stopping
any defendants from interfering with those rights. Dorey used the
connection between the original dam and the current surrounding
land rights as a basis for his claim.
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COURT REPORTS

A downstream gristmill owner conveyed the land near the outlet of
the Pond to a sawmill owner in 1839. The sawmill owner constructed
the dam in question during that same year to power a sawmill
operation. At one time, the sawmill owner conveyed a one-half
interest in all his sawmill property, along with "the right to draw water
for the use of any mills," to the downstream gristmill owner. However,
the gristmill owner relinquished that one-half interest back to the
sawmill owner in 1860. As time passed, early owners divided and sold
the land surrounding the Pond to various purchasers.
Dorey
purchased most of the gristmill property, and tried to acquire the
original sawmill property, near the dam, to generate electrical power
for his residence downstream. Dorey was able to purchase only small
portions of the original sawmill land, along with "the flowage rights
relative to the sawmill lots purchased." The previous owners conveyed
the sawmill land to Dorey through a single deed, and they conveyed
the flowage rights through a separate deed, which stated that the
flowage rights would be appurtenant to the sawmill land just
purchased.
Dorey claimed a private right to operate the dam and flood the
property of upstream waterfront owners, based on the Mill Act, 38
M.R.S.A. §§ 651-59 (1989). Dorey claimed his rights under the Act by
virtue of three sources. First, Dorey claimed that he had flowage rights
to the dam because he owned the gristmill land and, at one time, the
sawmill owner gave the gristmill owner a one-half interest in the water
rights connected to the dam. Second, Dorey claimed to have flowage
rights through his ownership of part of the original mill site. Lastly,
Dorey claimed the flowage rights due to the separate deed that gave
him those rights appurtenant to the sawmill lots he had recently
purchased. Eight of the defendants moved for summary judgment,
asserting that Dorey had no flowage rights, of any kind, to the dam.
The Maine Supreme Court held that summary judgment for the
defendants was proper. The court refused to allow any of Dorey's
alleged connections to the dam's flowage rights through the Mills Act.
Under strict construction, the Act's intent was to promote the control
of water flow for early industrial uses. The Act tied the water rights
directly to the ownership of the land, in the nature of an appurtenant
easement, benefiting the mill sight as the dominant tenant.
The court reasoned that the flowage rights at issue came into
existence when the mill owner built the sawmill and dam in 1839. It
was undisputed that the sawmill was no longer operational and Dorey
did not own the dam lot. To the extent that these flowage rights still
existed, they were in the nature of an appurtenant easement to the
dam lot alone, and could not exist apart from that lot. Therefore,
since Dorey owned some land once connected to the original sawmill,
but not the dam lot, he did not possess any flowage rights. In addition,
because the flowage rights could not exist separate from the dam lot,
other owners of the sawmill lots could not convey any flowage rights by
a separate deed, as Dorey alleged.
Finally, the court held that Dorey had no flowage rights through
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the ownership of the gristmill lots. The court reasoned that when the
gristmill owner relinquished his one-half interest in the sawmill
property back to the original owner, he merged that land under a
single owner. Any flowage right to the dam that might have existed
with the gristmill property ended with that merger.
Joseph A. Dawson

MARYLAND
A. H. Smith Assoc. Ltd. Part. v. Maryland Dept. of the Env't, 695 A.2d
1252 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1997) (affirming the imposition of civil fines
for violation of consent order and wastewater discharge).
A.H. Smith Associates Limited Partnership ("Smith"), owned and
operated a sand and gravel processing facility. The facility operated by
Smith required a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
("NPDES") permit for discharges of wastewater. The Maryland
Department of the Environment ("MDE") administered the NPDES
for the state of Maryland as authorized by the Environmental
Protection Agency. In March 1991, prior to the issuance of a permit,
MDE and Smith entered into a consent order allowing for the
discharge of wastewater. Both the consent order and NPDES permit
authorized the discharge of wastewater, consisting of sand and gravel,
wash water, and stormwater runoff. This discharge was subject to a
daily maximum and a monthly average maximum effluent limitation
for total suspended solids ("TSS"), and an effluent limitation on
turbidity with a daily maximum and a monthly average limit. MDE
monitored these limits once per week utilizing a grab sample. A grab
sample consists of a container filled directly from the outflow of the
source at a given point in time. During the period of the consent
order and later after issuance of the permit, MDE personnel found
numerous violations of the daily and monthly effluent limitations for
either TSS, turbidity, or both.
MDE filed suit in the circuit court for Prince George's County
seeking $297,000 in civil penalties and an injunction against further
violations of the permit. The court imposed $49,000 in fines against
Smith, but refused to issue an injunction. Smith appealed alleging:
the trial court abused its discretion in construing the consent order
and permit language in favor of MDE, thereby improperly imposing
liability; the trial court erred in concluding that the Appellant violated
both the consent order and the permit; and the trial court abused its
discretion in awarding $1,000 per violation despite clear and
uncontroverted mitigating factors in favor of MDE. Finding no error
on the part of the trial court, the appellate court affirmed.
Smith's appeal contended the state's sampling methods did not

